We document entry and capacity expansion in US long-distance fiber-optic networks before and during the "telecom boom." We disentangle the many swaps and leases between networks in order to measure owned route miles versus route miles shared with other carriers. Entry appears much more moderate when these shared miles are not counted. We conclude that entry was excessive primarily with regard to swaps and leases, but much less so with regard to the physical building of the networks.
Introduction
During the late 1990s there was tremendous investment and entry of new firms in the North American long-haul telecommunications industry. These expansions were driven by very fast demand growth for Internet and other data-oriented telecom services and by exponential decreases in the cost per bit transmitted using fiber optic communications equipment. But by 2001, competition and slowing demand growth were squeezing the profits of these carriers, and an equally unprecedented slowdown in spending occurred. The problems in the telecommunications sector have been blamed for dragging down growth in the entire U.S. economy.
As the expansion turned to bust, discussion of "excessive entry" and a "fiber glut" became increasingly common. Generally the fiber glut story revolves around three premises. First, Internet growth was not as fast as expected, and in particular, not as fast as Worldcom claimed (Odlyzko 2003) . Second, the still-high growth rate of data traffic was ". . . not nearly fast enough to use all of the millions of miles of fiber-optic lines that were buried beneath streets and oceans in the late-1990s frenzy."
1 Third, the equipment used to send data over fiber optic cable improved dramatically so that each strand of fiber could carry many more gigabits of data: "Perhaps never before has the efficiency of an industry's technology gotten so far ahead of demand." These gloomy statements have become the conventional wisdom: there was excessive entry of fiber-optic networks based on overoptimism and strategic behavior. But that interpretation is hard to justify because it says that firms invested without regard to demand and without a rational way to achieve a return on investment. In this paper, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is misleading and in many cases just plain wrong. It arises from two errors, one conceptual, and one factual.
The conceptual error is a misapplication of railroad history to fiber networks. Though both are long-distance transport infrastructure with expensive rights of way, the economics only partially overlap. In fiber networks there is a big difference between sunk investments -actual miles of right of way -and non-sunk investments that create "virtual networks" through relatively fungible swaps and leases of conduit space and fiber. There was nothing equivalent to virtual networks in railroading, and that makes the fiber case very different.
The factual error is that most observers have simply assumed that stated route miles of fiber indicate the total length of the fiber-optic networks. This is incorrect, because most public data mix real and virtual networks, creating confusion about the actual amount of sunk investment in facilities. We have collected new data that distinguishes the two types of networks, and we find that more than half of 1990-2001 investment was non-sunk. This makes the fiber boom much easier to explain, and it also means there is less "capacity overhang" than many people think.
Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2002, pg. B1.
Before moving further, let us clarify the industry segment we are discussing.
The national fiber-optic networks connect major cities using cable laid along railroad, gas pipeline, and other rights of way. This industry segment is not regulated by the FCC or other government agencies, except to the extent that there may be environmental and safety restrictions regarding rights of way. National networks sell high capacity links between specific cities and nationwide coverage to all cities. Their customers are primarily long-distance telephone companies, Internet backbone providers, and large corporations. Many of the companies are vertically integrated into some of these downstream segments.
The most famous example is AT&T which during the period of this study also offered long distance telephone service; other firms like Level 3 offer their own Internet backbones.
3 For this paper, we are focusing on the most basic level only -the physical infrastructure that allows these networks to operate. These firms have additional interest because many of them were involved in scandals, including Worldcom, Global Crossing, Qwest, and Enron.
There are several complementary types of infrastructure that we do not study here. These include regional and metropolitan fiber-optic networks and local access networks such as telephone and cable television -the latter two are surveyed by Woroch (2002) . Most of the traffic on the national networks has to traverse these other networks as well, but they operate in distinct markets. It is not practical to provide national service by combinations of regional networks, 3 Economides (2004) analyzes the Internet backbones and describes how the competition in national fiber networks has made entry quite easy in the backbone market.
nor is it practical to provide more than very limited regional service on a portion of a national network. While all types of networks experienced major investment in the late 1990s, it was the national fiber-optic networks that appeared to be the most "overbuilt" and were most implicated in the collapse.
To our knowledge there is no economics literature analyzing the national networks' growth and decline. Indeed, very little data has been collected on which firms entered when and where. Until 1998, Jonathan Kraushaar of the Federal Communications Commission published a yearly update on long distance fiber optic networks, but this was discontinued just as industry investment took off. In this paper we present newly collected data that merges
Kraushaar's work with publicly available information on firms' entry decisions up to the end of 2001.
Section 2 discusses the relevant theory of firm entry, investment, and sunk costs and applies it to the national fiber-optic network industry. We also compare the telecom crisis to the problems of late nineteenth century railroads. In section 3, we describe our data sources and methods of data collection. We analyze the pattern of entry and the decrease in industry concentration in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Sunk Costs and Fiber-Optic Networks
The building of the national fiber-optic networks is another chapter in the peculiar history of U.S. infrastructure industries. This history started with the canal boom of the early nineteenth century, reached its most dramatic episode in the railroad booms and busts of the late nineteenth century, and has continued since then with electricity transmission, trucking and Interstate highways, and cable television among others. All of these industries have been politically as well as economically important, and all have been characterized by financial instability and/or heavy government regulation.
In particular, the recent telecom boom and bust has been compared to the nineteenth century railroad experience, and the two do appear similar (Miller 2005) . In both cases, a large number of firms gained access to rights-of-way between major cities, built multiple parallel routes, and then engaged in intense competition that left many of them bankrupt. But we discuss below that the key to this comparison is the nature of sunk costs in the two industries, and that in fact the two are quite different in this regard.
We can think about sunk costs more precisely by looking at the gametheoretic literature in industrial organization. Sutton (1998) Under this interpretation, the key to competition between infrastructure firms is geography, since the sunk network scope investments mean that once a firm enters a territory it can commit not to leave. Traffic capacity, on the other hand, may affect short-run competitive outcomes (for example, it might lead to Cournot outcomes in the manner of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) ), but it does not carry long-run commitment value.
When we apply these ideas to long-haul fiber optic networks, we will see why these networks are so different from railroads and many other types of infrastructure. The difference is not in Stage 1. In that stage, building fiber network scope involves securing a right of way, burying protective conduits in this right-of-way, building "huts" to house equipment at intervals along the route, and placing fiber-optic cable inside the conduit. 4 Each strand of fiber has very large data capacity, each cable contains many strands of fiber, and many networks are built with multiple conduits. 5 It is prohibitively expensive to acquire new rights-of-way, so the networks generally follow highways, railroads, and natural gas pipelines. In fact, several of the major networks are associated with companies that own these rights-of-way. Williams, for example, was a natural gas pipeline owner, while Qwest was originally a division of the Southern Pacific Railroad. There is some irony in the comparison with nineteenth century railroads because in many cases the very same rights of way were used during the fiber boom.
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The difference with the railroads comes in Stage 2a, where traffic capacity is installed. Fiber networks use terminal equipment that takes electronic data from many sources, switches and combines it into channels, and converts it to optical signals using lasers. This is called "lighting" the fiber in the industry jargon. Such equipment is expensive but can be moved, resold, expanded, and contracted given sufficient lead time. There are some sunk costs involved, so 4 Planning of these networks is described and modeled in Lanning et al. (2000) .
5 There are periodically advances in the quality of fiber-optic strands, so systems in which it is easier to install new fiber have an advantage in the long run. 6 The geographic distribution of Internet infrastructure is discussed in Greenstein (forthcoming) .
the quantity of lit fiber has some short-run commitment value. But the key is that the amount of traffic capacity is not closely tied to the sunk network scope, since more or fewer conduits can be used, and more or fewer fibers can be lit.
Firms that owned real network scope took advantage of this flexibility.
They sold "indefeasible rights of use" (IRUs) by means of which firms could obtain either space in conduits or dark fiber (fiber-optic cable with no terminal equipment attached at the ends). Since most networks contain several conduits and many fibers, it is possible to sell IRUs to the same route several times.
For example, two major networks, Frontier and GTE, obtained IRUs to most of the route miles in Qwest's network in 1997 and 1998.
IRUs convey many of the rights of ownership, but they are typically limited to 20 years, can be dissolved by mutual agreement, and are frequently abrogated by bankruptcy courts. Furthermore, despite the careful language of IRU agreements, in an industry with rapidly changing technology there are likely to be many noncontractables that could render an IRU economically obsolete earlier than its legal expiration.
Let us define the two types of network scope more precisely:
Definition: Real network scope consists of the actual ownership of rightsof-way, conduits, and buildings that support a fiber-optic network. arrangements, we received cash up-front and we were recognizing revenue over the multi-year terms of the related agreements. In these cases where the customers elected to terminate the agreements prior to their contractual end and we had no continuing obligations, we recognized the remaining portion of the deferred revenue as other income as of the termination date."
simply emerged from bankruptcy with its debt reduced, and the number of competitors remained the same. This pattern, and the companies' collusive attempts to combat it, eventually led to regulation of the industry.
Data
Given this essential characteristic of the fiber industry, our goal was to collect data that carefully differentiate between real route miles which measure real network scope versus virtual route miles which reflect virtual network scope based on IRUs. The sum of these, total route miles, gives a measure of shortrun industry concentration, while real route miles alone gives an upper limit on concentration if all IRUs were dissolved.
8
During the period 1986-1998, the FCC collected route-mileage data from the inter-exchange (long distance) telephone companies. These data were compiled and analyzed by Jonathan Kraushaar in what was then the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau, and the reports continue to be available at the FCC's website. The FCC data collection proceeded through voluntary questionnaires and telephone calls, and they received a high response rate. Toward the end of the sample period, they expressed concern that fiber route miles were being double-counted, precisely for the reasons we discussed above.
Which Firms Were in the Industry?
Our first step was to define the universe of firms involved in national fiber-optic networks. Our source was the map "North American National and Regional While compiling data on the firms listed in Table 1 , we discovered IRU transactions with three additional carriers, and we added them to the sample.
They are listed in Table 2 .
Dynegy is an energy company which purchased a single, large IRU from Level 3 in 2001. XO is a telecom services firms which purchased IRUs to a Name Former Name(s) Dynegy Genuity GTE XO NEXTLINK did purchase a midwest regional network that included real route miles. This regional network was not counted as part of Genuity's national network totals in their own documents or in our data.
Route Mile Data
For each network, we obtained a network map, either from the company's web site (in most cases) or from an Internet service provider reseller (for Qwest, MCIWorldcom, McLeodUSA, and ENRON). We first checked these maps against the KMI Map discussed above, and found only minor inconsistencies which related to routes planned but not actually constructed. These are generally shown on the KMI Map but not on the networks' own maps.
For each carrier, we checked the firms' annual reports and investment prospectuses as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and available through the online EDGAR database (primarily forms 10-K and S-4).
Some companies included very meticulous network data with these filings, while others simply mentioned route miles in passing.
For AT&T, Sprint, and MCI, the networks were substantially complete in 1990, the company reports matched the FCC figures, and we have no evidence that these companies engaged in any trades involving IRUs prior to 1998.
Thus, we used the FCC figures for these networks up until 1998. For all other networks we were able to reconstruct the process of building the network on a route-by-route basis, matching location and route-mile data from company reports against the route maps and cross-checking with the FCC data where applicable. Note that we did not attempt to compute route-mileages from the maps, but simply used them to be sure that all pieces of the network were accounted for in the company reports.
In nearly all cases, the promotional and technical materials made available by telecom firms do not differentiate between the two types of route miles. But as we built up data on each network, we determined which routes are based on IRUs and which real right of way. In some cases, routes are jointly owned, in which case we count one-half the miles for each of two owners and one-third for each of three. Jointly owned routes are a much smaller portion of total mileage than are IRUs and do not greatly affect the totals.
To supplement the maps and company reports, we also searched each company's press releases using the archives on LEXIS/NEXIS. In many cases, firms obtained routes by swapping IRUs to their own right of way for IRUs to the right of way of their competitors. The firms often announced and promoted these swaps as an inexpensive way to build their network quickly. In several cases, firms swapped access to a preexisting IRU for a preexisting IRU on another firm's route, so that the swaps could be more than one layer deep. Be-cause of this, we frequently know that a route is based on an IRU but cannot definitely determine the source of that IRU. Fortunately, this problem does not affect the computation of virtual versus real route miles.
Although we are quite confident that the routes identified as shared are in fact shared, there are probably additional IRUs and swaps that were not reported. As such, the database is conservative since it attributes all other miles as owned. We were not able to find as complete data on Sprint as on other networks. All our sources suggest that Sprint's network was largely completed before the sample period and not significantly expanded thereafter. For years in which no data was available for Sprint, we have assumed no expansion and entered the previous year's figure.
Entry and Investment
We now document the pattern of entry and show that a large proportion of investment is virtual miles. When only owned miles are considered, entry appears more moderate and industry concentration more typical of a highsunk-cost industry. 6% 1998 1999 2000 2001 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 EPIK's sudden contraction from national to regional network demonstrates that the network scope of some of these companies did not consist of sunk assets. Tables 2 and 3 show real route miles of each firm in each of the years and the percentage of total route miles that were real. Table 4 : Real Route Miles, 1990 Miles, -2001 At the beginning of the 1990s, all networks were owned outright by the carriers. But entry in the later 90s involved so many swaps and IRUs that many "national" carriers owned only a small percent of their rights of way, and in a few cases owned none at all. The IRU strategy does not appear to have been a temporary expedient to expand network reach, since most carriers were decreasing their percentage owned even as they served more route miles.
The bulk of total investment in network route miles came during 1998, 1999, and 2000. The majority of the new miles in this period were shared.
New right of way built in this period is mostly accounted for by upgrades to the old AT&T and MCIWorldcom networks and the entry of three new major networks, Qwest, Level 3, and Williams (see Figure 1) . One way to interpret this is that four incumbents were joined by three entrants and fringe firms that 5% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Miles, 1990 Miles, -2001 were partially dependent on the seven major networks. 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Added through sharing Miles, 1990 Miles, -2001 These data suggest that the industry did not experience overbuilding and ruinous competition along the same lines as the railroads of the late 1800s.
Rather, actual construction of new rights of way represented more modest entry, but the swaps of IRUs created a very competitive environment in which prices fell.
Measuring Concentration
One goal of this paper is to answer the question of whether too many national networks were built. We can take a first cut at this answer by simply looking at the total number of firms in the industry. The first column of Table 6 shows the number of networks with a positive number of total route miles for each year. These numbers are quite high even in 1990, and rise to a very competitive industry of 19 firms by 2001. As we have seen, however, many of these networks were based on virtual route miles, so the second column of Table 6 show the number of firms with networks above this threshold, using both total and real route miles as measures. This does not change the totals much using total miles, but for owned miles the number of firms falls drastically.
Another important aspect of fiber-optic networks is route diversity. Data networks depend on extremely high reliability, and even outages of less than 1 second can cause significant financial damage to customers because systems may crash, take time to reboot, and important pieces of data may be lost. To prevent these problems, networks strive to develop multiple routes between all cities and employ switching systems that can reroute traffic within milliseconds if a link is cut. In the process of developing route diversity, more small cities can also be served, adding to the competitive strength of the network.
As a result, networks of various sizes can serve different types of traffic.
10 Josh Gonze, "LDX, WilTel To Merge Net Forces," Network World, 6/22/87, pg. 9.
11 In Table 3 , EPIK appears never to have reached this threshold, but it briefly rose above it during 2001 before giving up its IRUs and reassuming its regional network role in Florida.
Prior to attaining national coverage, a network can serve a limited set of citypairs. A sparse national network can add nationwide networking to its menu of products. Denser networks can serve more secondary cities and they can also offer a higher level of reliability.
Thus, the competition for basic connectivity between major U.S. cities is essentially symmetric between all networks above a certain size, but the competition for basic connectivity in smaller cities and for high-redundancy networks is less symmetric. Larger networks have an advantage in these latter two markets. We use a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on route miles to give some sense of the level of competition in these other markets. The HHI and the equivalent number of equal-sized firms (calculated from the inverse of the HHI) for each year based on total miles and owned miles appear in Table 7 .
Not all of the networks use their capacity equally, but these measures based on route miles do provide a guide to the potential long-run industry structure.
The difference between competition in terms of total miles and owned miles is striking. Using total miles, the industry moved from an oligopolistic HHI to a very competitive one. But using owned miles, the industry remained above the 1,000 limit for government scrutiny of mergers based on the Department of Justice's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Still, there were eight equivalent equal-sized firms using owned miles, which is a large number of competitors by the standards of previous infrastructure developments such as railroads and early telephone. Mile, 1990 Mile, -2001 Mile, (1995 Industry revenue is reported Table 8 . We then attempt to create some notion of capacity utilization by calculating industry revenue per mile. We report this measure for both total and real miles in the final two columns of Table 8 .
In 1990 there appear to have been modest opportunities to expand route miles since there was a gradual increase in miles in the succeeding years. An interesting feature of these data is that in 1995-97, there were arguably opportunities to add route mileage (based on revenue), particularly when looking at real miles only. By the end of the sample period, revenue per mile had fallen sharply. Real miles show much less of this trend than total miles due to the extensive use of shared mileage.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the conventional wisdom that there was "excessive" investment in national fiber-optic networks that ended with a crash in 2001. We
showed that there is a conceptual and a factual problem with this conventional wisdom. The conceptual problem is that sunk investment in rights of way is not closely tied to non-sunk investment in traffic capacity that allows these networks to be used. This invalidates the analogy with early railroad investment, where right of way and traffic capacity were inextricably linked.
The factual problem with the conventional wisdom is that previous data on network route miles has not distinguished between real route miles representing right of way and virtual route miles representing leased capacity within others' rights of way. We have sorted through each firm's SEC reports and press releases, and we have been able to discover which routes are based on sunk investments in right of way and conduit and which are based on relatively non-sunk investment in IRUs. We find that more than half of total route miles added during the period 1990-2001 were based on non-sunk forms of investment. We conclude that the loss-producing level of competition that prevailed circa 2001 was due more to the willingness of firms to sell IRUs than to actual over-investment like that which occurred in the nineteenth century railroad boom.
We calculated industry-wide changes in revenue per route mile. This measure suggests that there were opportunities for increased investment in route miles in the mid-1990s, but that investment after that proceeded faster than revenue growth.
Our general conclusion is that the "excessive" element of national fiberoptic network investment was the very extensive sharing of route miles using
IRUs. This sharing led to remarkably low concentration for an industry with such high fixed, sunk costs. Not including sharing, the underlying investment in owned route miles was more moderate, and led to more reasonable (if still low) industry concentration.
